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THE PRESENT AND PROPOSED
TAXATION OF
NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
VICTOR PETERS and FRANK ZAID*
INTRODUCTION
The taxation of non-profit entities involves in itself a contradiction of
terms. Section 2 of the Income Tax Act1 imposes a tax on the income of a person
and section 4 defines income from a business or property as "the profit there-
from". In that case, a truly non-profit entity, that is, one which makes no profit,
need not be concerned with taxation since its income would be nil. However,
this is not the sense in which we use the word "non-profit". Of course, some
non-profit entities in fact make no profit, for example, a service organization
providing its services at cost. But we are not concerned with these entities,
since they have no income which could be taxed. Instead, we are concerned
only with those entities that make a profit, but which are described as non-profit
in the sense that they don't distribute that profit to their proprietors, share-
holders or members. Of this group, there are basically three types: first, the
charitable organization; second, the private club or society; and third, a number
of special organizations such as labour unions.
At present these entities are exempted from tax by the various subsections
of section 62 [section 149 of the Bill2). The exemptions are total - that is,
they pay no tax at all if they conform with one of the exempting subsections.
Therefore we shall firstly examine these subsections as they apply to each of
the basic types of non-profit organizations. Secondly, we shall consider some
of the criticisms of the present system and suggestions for future reform.
THE TAXATION OF CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
There are two types of charitable organizations which are exempt from tax
under the Canadian Income Tax Act. The first is the organization that actually
operates a charity, which is exempt by virtue of s. 61(1) (e) [s. 149(1) (f) of
the Bill], and the second is the organization that distributes its funds for chari-
table purposes, which is exempted by s. 62(1) (f) and s. 62(1) (g) [ss. 149-
(1) (g) and (h) of theBill].
*Members of the 1971 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
'R.S.C. 1952, c. 148, as amended.
2 Bill C-259 to amend the Income Tax Act and other Acts, hereinafter referred to
as the Bill.
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Charitable Organizations that operate Charities, s. 62(1)(e).
An organization is entitled to an exemption under s. 62(1) (e) only if all
its resources are devoted to charitable activities which it carries on itself. Thus
no part of its income may be given to another charity, but it must all be expended
on some charitable project carried on under its own direct supervision and
control.
The biggest problem in interpreting s. 62(1) (e) is the meaning of the
word "charity". The words "charity" or "charitable organization" are nowhere
defined in the Act and therefore we must look elsewhere for their meaning. The
leading case is Pemsel v. Special Commissioner.3 In this case Lord Mac-
Naughton defined "charity" by a division into four classes: "trusts for the relief
of poverty, trusts for the advancement of education, trusts for the advancement
of religion, and trusts for other purposes beneficial to the community not falling
under any of the other heads."'4
It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the common law meaning of
the word "charity" and what sort of organizations are likely to be held not
charitable. For the present, let us consider only organizations which are clearly
charitable.
However, a question which we must consider is whether an organization,
clearly charitable, can carry on a business and still retain its charitable character.
In the case of Royal College of Surgeons of England v. National Provincial Bank
Limited' it was held that a charitable corporation remains charitable even
though it promotes other interests or purposes, provided .such purposes are
merely incidental to the main object. In other words, a charitable organization
could carry on a business so long as that purpose were merely ancillary to its
main purpose, which would be charitable. In addition, it can be argued that
s. 62(1) (f) and s. 62 (1) (g) make it clear that the organizations described
there cannot carry on any business and because no similiar exclusion is set out
in s. 62 (1) (e) a charitable organization could be such within the meaning of
s. 62(1) (e) even if it carried on a business. In a lecture given to members of
the Canadian Tax Foundation in 1960, Mr. Arthur W. Gilmour, C.A., said that
it would appear that an organization as long as its activities were charitable
could "carry on a commercial, industrial or financial business, as long as the
resources of the organization were devoted to charitable activities carried on
by itself".6
Also, in M.N.R. v. Begin,7 the Exchequer Court of Canada held that a
partnership which operated a beer business but where all the profits were to be
distributed for purposes of social welfare, charity, education and civic improve-
ment, was nevertheless entitled to an exemption under s. 62(1) (e). This was
a clear case of a charitable organization operating a business and yet retaining
its charitable character.
3(1891] A.C. 531.
4 d. at 583.
5[1952) A.C. 631.
OLD. McKellar, Charitable Foundations (1965), 8 Can. Bar. J. 7, 11.
762 D.T.C. 1099, [1962] C.T.C. 148 (Exch. Ct.).
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On the other hand, however, there is a Supreme Court of Canada decision
on this question which may throw doubt on the strength of the rules stated in
the Royal College of Surgeons case. In R.' v. The Assessors of the Town of
Sunny Brae,s the court had to deal with a New Brunswick Act exempting from
municipal taxation "the property of any literary or charitable institution". In
that case, a society whose objectives were the advancement of education and
the relief of poverty, carried on a laundry and drycleaning business which was
described as being "very extensive", and involved the operation of two motor
cars for picking up and delivering clothing and considerable laundry and dry-
cleaning equipment. Three members of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rinfret
and Kerwin and Cartwright, J.J., held that notwithstanding the operation of the
laundry and drycleaning business the Society remained a charitable institution
because in its objects the running of such a business- was described as "inci-
dental" to its main objects and the. income produced was used for charitable
activities. Mr. Justice Cartwright delivering the judgment for those three
members of the court said: "This is not the case of an institution carrying on a
commercial business and incidentally performing sundry charitable work or
paying over its profits to be used by others for charitable purposes, but rather
that of a society or institution of which all the primary purposes are purely
charitable which is actively engaged in carrying on charitable works and which
as an incidental means of providing some of the money which is required for
the prosecution of such charitable works, carries on a business under statutory
powers."9
On the other hand, Mr. Justice Rand in a judgment agreed to by Mr.
Justice Locke, said that they were considering a case of a society of "mixed
objects and works or activities, some of which are charitable and some not."
He said: "We have to-day many huge foundations yielding revenues applied
solely to charitable purposes; they may consist, as in one case, of a newspaper
business; even if these foundations themselves carried on the charitable adminis-
trations, to characterize them as charitable institutions merely because of the
ultimate destination of the 'net revenues, would be to distort the meaning of
familiar language; and to make that ultimate application the sole test of the
charitable quality would introduce into the law conceptions that might have
destructive implications upon basic principles not only of taxation but of
economic and constitutional relations generally. If that is to be done, it must
be done by the legislature."10
Mr. Justice Kellock thought the society was not charitable because he
found the operation to be conducted with "commercial considerations in view
and on commercial principles". As an entirety he said, the society could not
be the object of a valid charitable trust and could not therefore be said to be a
8 [19521 2 S.C.R. 76.
9Id. at 85.
1id. at 92. Note also that this statement is an express denial of the "destination
of income" test laid down in Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores (1924), 263
U.S. 578 where the Supreme Court of the United States said that it was not interested in
how money was raised but rather how it was used. If the earnings were applied for purely
charitable purposes the organization should not lose its exemption even though the income
was derived from non-charitable activities.
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charitable corporation." In effect, he considered the organization not to be
charitable within the definition in Pensel's case.
Three judges then said the society was charitable, and three said it was not,
and the other judge, Mr. Justice Estey, did not get to the question of "charity"
because he dealt with the case as a matter of statute interpretation as falling
under a different section of the Act.' 2 As a result, there was no clear decision
by the Supreme Court of Canada on the question of whether a charitable
corporation can operate a business and still retain its charitable character. In
its absence, we can only assume that the principle in the Royal College of
Surgeons case still stands.
It should also be noted that an organization is entitled to exemption only
if "all its resources" are devoted to charitable activities. This is usually inter-
preted to mean simply that it cannot retain a part of its income for the year as
a reserve. For example, in the Pas Lumber Company Limited v. M.N.R., 13
although the capital of the organization in question was approximately
$20,000.00 in its first year it used only some $475.00 of its interest income for
charitable activities. The Tax Appeal Board decided that all its resources were
not devoted to charitable activities.
As has been discussed above, however, the restriction that "all the
resources" are to be devoted to charitable activities has not been interpreted
as meaning that the charity cannot carry on a business, as long as it is merely
incidental to its charitable purposes.
The last requirement of s. 62(1) (e) deserving comment is the part pro-
hibiting income from being payable to or otherwise available for the personal
benefit of any proprietor, member or shareholder. Words similar to these are
contained in several subsections of s. 62, and their interpretation will be dis-
cussed later on under a discussion of s. 62 (1) (i).14
Organizations Distributing Funds for Charitable Purposes, Ss. 62(1)(f) and
62(1)(g).
The organizations covered by these sections are those which have been
constituted exclusively for charitable purposes but distribute at least part of
their income to other charitable bodies rather than devoting all their resources
to their own charitable activities. If the organization is a corporation it can be
exempted under s. 62(1) (f) and if a trust under s. 62(1) (g). In both cases
it is subject to the same conditions. Note also that an organization actually
carrying on a charitable activity presumably could also be exempted under
s.62 (1) (f) or s.62(1) (g) but it is more preferable for it to get an exemption
under s. 62 (1) (e) since, as we shall see, it would not be subject to the greater
restrictions imposed by s. 62(1) (f) and s. 62(1) (g). Conversely, the M.N.R.
would prefer to grant on exemption under s. 62(1) (f) or (g) than under
s. 62(1) (e).
111d. at 101.
12d. at 104.
1859 D.T.C. 95 (T.A.B.).14 See text, infra, at 369.
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Identical with those in s. 62(1) (e), an organization seeking exemption
under s. 62(1) (f) or (g) must be constituted exclusively for charitable pur-
poses, and no part of its income may be payable to or otherwise available for
the personal benefit of any proprietor, member or shareholder thereof.
In addition, however, it must conform to several other conditions.
The organization may not, since June 1st, 1950, have "acquired control
of any corporation". "Control" is defined for this purpose in s. 62(3) (a)
[s. 149(7) (a) of the Bill] and an organization "shall be deemed not to have
acquired control of a corporation if it has not purchased (or otherwise acquired
for consideration) any of the shares in the capital stock of that corporation".
Thus, if a charitable organization, as a result of a gift or gifts of shares acquires
control of another corporation, then, provided it has not purchased any shares
of the controlled corporation, it will still be eligible for exemption under
s. 62(1) (f) or (g).15 If, however, a charitable organization had purchased a
minority interest in a corporation and later received as gifts sufficient shares to
give it control, it would lose its exemption.
The organization is specifically prohibited from carrying on a business.
Recall that this specific prohibition can be argued to authorize the business
activity of an organization exempt under s. 62(1)(e), since that subsection
doesn't have a similiar specific prohibition.
The organization must (unless prior to January 1st, 1940 it was consti-
tuted exclusively for charitable purposes) expend at least 90% of its income
each year on any combination of charitable activities carried on by itself, gifts
to charities exempt under s. 62(1) (e), gifts to charitable corporations exempt
under s. 62(1) (f), or gifts to the Government of Canada, a province, or a
municipality. Note that gifts to charitable trusts exempt under s. 62(1) (g)
are not included in the list of permissible expenditures.
However, it is provided in s. 62(4) [s. 149 (9) of the Bill] that in computing
its income, a charitable organization may deduct "an amount not exceeding its
income for the year preceding" but shall include "any amount that has been
deducted under this subsection for the immediately preceding taxation year".
It is also provided in s. 62(5) that in its first taxation year "the whole or,any
part of amounts expended by it in the immediately subsequent taxation year
shall "if it so elects" be deemed to have been expended by it in the first taxation
year and not in the subsequent taxation year." The effect of these provisions is
to permit the organization to accumulate a reserve equal to its income for the
preceding year. In addition, of course, it may accumulate the 10% of its income
every year which it is not required to distribute. In this respect, organizations
exempt under s. 62(1) (f) or (g) may be better off than those exempt under
s. 62(1) (e) since the latter must devote "all the resources" to charitable activi-
ties and are thus prohibited from accumulating a reserve.
Also, it is provided in s. 62 (3) (b) [s. 149 (7) (b) of the Bill] that a chari-
table organization must include in computing its income, all gifts received by
the organization, except those specifically exempted in the same subsection.
25 Note, however, that in Ontario, the Charitable Gifts Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 61,
prevents the gifting of an interest greater than 10% of a business to a charitable organiza-
tion.
19711
OSGOODE HALL LAW- JOURNAL
Conclusion
There are several deficiencies in the taxation of charitable organizations.
In the first place, there appears to be no consistency behind some of the prohi-
bitions imposed by ss. 62(1) (e), (f) and (g). For example, the restriction
imposed on operating charities that they must' devote all their resourbes to
charitable works is inconsistent with the permission granted foundations that
they may accumulate a reserve equal to their preceding year's income plus 10%
of each year's income. If anything, the operating charities would have a greater
need for a reserve fund yet they are precluded from having one despite the fact.
that foundations are so allowed for no-apparent reason. Similarly, foundations'
are precluded from *operating a business or controlling a corporation, but
operating charities are not. Again there is no apparent reason for this distinction.
Secondly, there is no valid reason that we can see for these prohibitions.
to constitute conditions for tax exemption. Certainly if an organization fails
to adhere to a relevant prohibition, it ought not to be exempted from paying
tax on the income derived therefrom, but why should it lose its exemption with
respect 'to its other income? Thus, for example, if a charity accumulates 25%
of its income one year to set up a reserve fund, it ought to be taxed on that
portion of its income (assuming the prohibition was relevant in the first place),
but still be exempted on the remaining 75% that was expended for charitable
purposes.
And lastly, the common law definition of "charity" and its subsequent
interpretations are not wholly satisfactory.
THE TAXATION OF CLUBS, SOCIETIES,
ASSOCIATIONS, AND NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS
S. 62(1)(i) [s. 149(1) (1) of the Bill] exempts from taxation "a club,
society or association organized and operated exclusively for social welfare,
civic improvement, pleasure or recreation or for any other purpose except
profit, no part of the income of which was payable to, or was otherwise available
for the personal benefit of, any proprietor, member or shareholder thereof'.
From this section it is obvious that any organization claiming an exemption
must fulfil two conditions. The first condition really has two parts; these parts
are that the organizations must be one of the correct types (a club, society or
association) and the second part is that the correct type must be organized and
operated exclusively for one of the correct purposes. The second basic condition
is that which appears in almost all the subsections of s. 62(1)-that no part
of the income be available for the benefit of any member or shareholder.
We will now go on to consider these two conditions separately.
1. The condition of proper organizations and proper purposes
From the wording of s. 62(1)(i), it would appear that this section is
directed towards unincorporated organizations. Howeveri there have been
many cases which have held that s. 62(1) (i) does not exclude incorporated
[VOL. 9, N6. .2
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companies.' 6 Furthermore, even a company incorporated under Part I of the
Canada Corporations Act (i.e. a regular company with share capital) has been
held to fall within the definition or meaning of the word "association"Y.7
The meaning of the words "civic improvement" has been dealt with in
several cases. In Moose Jaw Industrialization Fund Committee v. M.N.R.' 8 a
special company was incorporated to work for the advancement of a city by
encouraging the establishment of new industries in that city. It was held that
the association was formed solely for civic improvement. In Forest Lawn
Cemetery Company v. M.N.R.'9 a company was incorporated under the British
Columbia Cemeteries Act to establish and maintain a public cemetery. It was
held in this case that the company was operating solely for civic improvement.
From the above cases and from a consideration of s. 62(1) (i) it is
apparent that the organization claiming exemption must be both "organized
and operated" exclusively for one of the enumerated purposes. In order to
discuss whether an organization is organized exclusively for one of the required
purposes, it will be necessary to closely examine the Letters Patent, Memoran-
dum of Association or By-laws of the organization. To determine whether a
-company is operated exclusively for one of the purposes, it will be necessary
to look at the actual conduct and affairs of the organization.
It is most important to always realize that both the organization and opera-
tion of the club, society or association must be exclusively for one of the
enumerated purposes. Therefore, it would seem that if the institution in
question largely carries on its activities to fall within one of the enumerated
purposes but also carries on activities which fall outside of the enumerated
purposes, then it will not receive the tax exemption it seeks.
It is now essential to consider the meaning of "for any other purpose except
profit". If the club, society or association could show itself to be within the
meaning of social welfare, civic improvement, pleasure or recreation, then
there is no restriction which would prevent the organization from carrying on
a business and/or making profit so long as the institution was organized and
operated exclusively to further those purposes. But if it is not within the mean-
ing of these enumerated purposes then it must show itself to be "for any other
purpose except profit". Then, in this case the carrying on of business or the
making of income is a real issue. The leading case as to what is meant by non-
profitable purposes is St. Catherines Flying School Limited v. M.N.R.20, a case
before the Supreme Court of Canada. In this case a flying school was incorpor-
ated under Part I of the Dominion Companies act as a normal share-capital com-
pany. It agreed with the Government to train members of the R.C.A.F. in return
for payments. Its charter contained a provision prohibiting the distribution of
16See, e.g., Moose Jaw Industrialization Fund Committee,.v. M.N.R., 51 D.T.C.
325 (T.A.B.); Forest Lawn Cemetery Company v. M.N.R., 52 D.T.C. 84 (T.A.B.), both
of which involved incorporated bodies.
17See St. Catherines Flying Training School Ltd. v. M.N.R., 53 D.T.C. 1232, 1235,
[1953) C.T.C. 362, 369 (Exch.Ct.).
1851 D.T.C. 325 (TA.B.).
1951 D.T.C. 84 (T.A.B.).
2055 D.T.C. 1145, [1955] C.T.C. 185 (S.C.C.), rev'g 53 D.T.C. 1232, [1953]
C.T.C. 362 (Exch.Ct.).
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dividends for the duration of the school's training contract with the Govern-
ment. This original contract was replaced by a second one under which the
Club agreed not to distribute any surplus earned by it but to pay any such
surplus earned to another club approved by the Minister of National Defence,
failing which it would go to the Crown. The M.N.R. contended that the profits
earned under both agreements were taxable. In the judgment of the Exchequer
Court, Thorson, P. explored the meaning of "non-profitable purposes". First,
he held that it does not follow simply that because the taxpayer made profits
that the taxpayer organization was not organized and operated for non-profitable
purposes.21 He then continued to state that non-profitable purposes
cannot mean that the purposes must be such that profit does not result from
carrying them on, for the section assumes the possibility of making profits in the
course of carrying out non-profitable purposes. The term must, therefore, mean
something other than purposes from the carrying out of which profit might possibly
result.
In my judgement, the purposes referred to must be purposes that are carried
out without the motive or intention of making a profit, that is to say, purposes other
than that of profit making.22
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Locke, J. did not discuss Thorson, P.'s
interpretation of the meaning of "non-profitable purposes". Therefore, although
the judgment of the Exchequer Court was reversed in part, it would seem that
this interpretation of the term still stands.
Thus, it is essential to distinguish between purposes which are non-profit
in nature and the results of carrying out these non-profitable purpos6s. That
is, it may be that the results of carrying out the non-profitable purposes are that
profit is made; however, so long as the club, society or association is organized
and operated exclusively for purposes except profit the fact that profit or income
may result will not affect the status of the organization.
An example of the narrow distinction between an organization organized
and operated exclusively for non-profit versus profit purposes is the case of
M.N.R. v. The Lakeview Golf Club Limited.23 In this case the Golf Club was
incorporated with share capital and the shares were owned by no more than
seven shareholders. In the years in question the company made a profit but
no dividends had ever been paid by the company. The company operated a
golf club, membership in which was acquired by the payment of an annual fee.
The fee-paying members did not acquire any shares in the company. Non-
members also played on a pay-as-you-play basis. The company was assessed
for income tax forthe years in question. The company contended that it was
organized and operated exclusively for recreation or pleasure within the mean-
ing of the exempting section. However, the Exchequer Court held that the
company was not organized exclusively for recreation or pleasure because one
of the other purposes of the club was to make profit. By-law No. 35 of the
company provided that dividends when earned and declared shall be paid to
the shareholders. In considering this by-law, Cameron, J. decided that the club
2153 D.T.C. 1232, 1235, [1953], C.T.C. 362,370.
221d.
2352 D.T.C. 1164, E1952] C.T.C. 278 (Exch.Ct.).
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was not organized exclusively for recreation or pleasure, but that it was
organized and operated for the purpose of profit making as well:
[that is the clearest possible evidence that the directors and shareholders con-
templated the possibility of profit being earned and that in such a case they would
be available when declared, to the shareholders.24
Also, the fact that the company did in reality make a profit for the years
in question further supported this view.
Therefore, it is again important to reiterate that the very fact that the
by-laws or Letters Patent of the organization even contemplate the future possi-
bility of profits will be sufficient to exclude the organization from falling with-
in the meaning of "organized... exclusively ... for any other purpose except
profit" in s. 62(1) (i). The reasoning is again obvious-any organization which
contemplates the possibility of future earnings cannot be said to be organized
exclusively for non-profit purposes. Such a contemplation in the Letters Patent
is fatal to the organization and the fact that it may or may not make a profit is
irrelevant.
All the leading cases in this area of non-profit organizations have fully
considered the Letters Patent, memoranda of association, or by-laws of the
institution in question in order to decide whether or not the institution is one
organized for purposes other than profit. Therefore, it is essential to investigate
these cases.
2. The Effect of the Letters Patent, Memoranda of Association or by-laws of
the Organization in Determining its profit or non-profit status
The leading case in this area as already stated is the St. Catherines Flying
Training School Limited case. 25 The facts of this case have already been given.26
The Supreme Court of Canada considered the two agreements separately in
deciding whether or not the organization should be taxed. It held that the profits
realized from the company's operations under the first contract with the Crown
were properly taxed as income since the company was carrying out one of its
declared objects for which it was incorporated in its Letters Patent-that is,
the carrying on of such work was one of the declared objects of the company.
The reference to dividends in the Letters Patent of the Company persuaded the
Court that profit making was one of the objects of the Company. Although the
Charter of the Company contained a provision prohibiting the distribution of
dividends for the duration of the school's training contract with the government,
the Court felt that this prohibition against dividends or profits being distributed
was not permanently restrictive and the company could have retained its profits.
However, the Court decided that the profits realized under the second agree-
ment with the Crown were not taxable since the surplus resulting was held by
the Company upon terms which were equivalent to saying that the Company
held the surplus in trust for the Crown.
However, the important point to notice in the case is that the Supreme
Court looked almost exclusively to the powers given to the Company under its
241d. at 116, [1952] C.T.C. at 282.
25Supra note 20.
26See text, supra at 365.
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Charter to own and dispose of its profits. This power in the Charter governed
the issue and not the fact that the Company entered into agreements which
precluded its profits from reaching its shareholders or members. The Court
attached great weight to the fact that the Company was incorporated under
Part I rather than Part II of the Companies Act. Thus, although the essence
of the matter was that the Company had placed its profits beyond the reach of
its members and shareholders, the fact that legally it had the power to dispose
of the profits to the members and shareholders took precedence over all other
considerations. In the course of his judgment, Locke, J. reinforced the view
that the Letters Patent provisions are to be strictly construed in determining
whether an organization will achieve tax exempt status as a non-profit organiza-
tion:
The question of the liability of the respondent to taxation depends, not upon the
intention of the promoters or the shareholders as to the disposition to be made
of the profits but rather upon consideration of the terms of the Letters Patent, the
nature of the business authorized to be carried on and of the business which was
carried on which resulted in the earnings of the income.... If the company had
succeeded in obtaining Letters Patent which prohibited the payment of dividends
completely and, in addition, the retention of any earned income by the company,
different considerations, which need not here be considered, would arise.2 7
Therefore, it is apparent from this part of the judgment that the Letters
Patent provisions rather than the actual operations of the company determine
whether or not it will get tax-exempt status. On the basis of the decision in the
St. Catherines Flying Training School case, it would seem that the decision in
Edmonton District Milk and Cream Producers Association Limited v. M.N.R.2 8
is incorrect. In that case the Income Tax Appeal Board stated that it is not so
much what the taxpayer could or might do as what it actually did that counts
in determining whether or not the wide powers of the company will destroy the
non-profit status of the company.
The courts have often considered external agreements in determining
whether or not an organization is tax exempt, e.g. the courts consider company
contracts, partnership agreements, and statutory restrictions on the organiza-
tion. For example, in the case of M.N.R. v. BeginP'a partnership was formed
to sell beer in a Quebec town and the partnership agreement provided that the
partners would distribute all profits for puiposes of social welfare, charity,
education and civic improvement. The partnership agreement also specifically
provided that the partners could not draw, retain or appropriate any of the
sums to be distributed and that, if the partnership were dissolved, all assets
would be distributed for the same charitable purposes. The Exchequer Court
held that the partnership was exempt from taxation as a non-profit organization
since the partners had never received any of the profits and they had no claim
and no right at any future time to the profits of the partnership. In the Moose
Jaw Industrialization Fund case"° the memorandum of association of the com-
pany prohibited the payments of dividends to its members. The Tax Appeal
Board, after finding that the corporation was established solely for civic
improvement, stated that the problem with regard to what would happen to the
27Supra note 20 at 1148, [1955] C.T.C. at 190.
28[1953] D.T.C. 282 (T.A.B.).
2062 D.T.C. 1099, [1962] C.T.C. 148 (Exch.Ct.).
3OSupra note 18.
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earnings of the company on its winding up could not be considered in determin-
ing its tax exempt status since there was no reason to anticipate such a winding
up. The Tax Appeal Board stated that such an eventuality is not to be con-
templated in interpreting what was then s. 4(h) of the Income War Tax Act
(which sectionis analogous to the present s. 62(1) (i)).
In the Montreal Milk case31 Kearney, J. discussed the effect of a company
which has Letters Patent of a commercial nature but which does not carry on
these commercial activities. He said, "Even if it be true, as claimed by the
appellant, that it did not pursue some of its stated objects of a commercial and
gainful nature, such as the purchase and sale of cattle, nevertheless because
it had declared objects of such nature, the association cannot, in my opinion,
qualify as a company organized exclusively for purposes other than profit."82
Therefore, it is again essential to remember that the organization of the com-
pany (i.e. the Letters Patent) must be such that the company is organized
wholly and exclusively for purposes other than profit.
3. Consideration of the Meaning of "No part of the income of which was
payable to, or was otherwise available for the personal benefit of, any
proprietor, member or shareholder"
The first point to be considered in determining whether income is available
or payable for the benefit of a shareholder or member is the effect of earned
surplus or undistributed income of the company. Recall that in Begin 3 the
partnership, had profits which could not be distributed to the partners because
of the partnership agreement restricting such distribution. Similarly, in the
Forest Lawn Cemetery Company case,34 the British Columbia Cemetery Com-
panies Act prevented the profits from being distributed to shareholders. Also,
in the St. Catherines Flying Training School case,35 the second contract with
the government was considered to be a bar to distribution of profits earned.
Furthermore, the Moose law Industrialization Fund Committee case36 stated
that the problem of what will happen to the surplus on a potential winding up
is not to be contemplated in determining whether a company is a non-profit
organization. In contrast, the Lakeview, Golf Club case37 stated that since the
company had the power to declare dividends although it never had done so
and since it used its earned surpluses to make repairs or improvements required
by the club in its operation, the club was a profit-making organization.
All of these cases simply represent the proposition that if the Letters
Patent or other formal agreements provide a possibility of future distribution
of earnings to the members, then it can not be said that no part of the income is
available for the personal benefit of the members.
31Montreal Milk Producers' Co-operative Agricultural Assoc., 58 D.T.C. 1010,
[1958] C.T.C. 1 (Exch.Ct.).
321d. at 1012, [1958] C.T.C. at 6.
33Supra note 29.
U4Supra note19.
35Supra note 20.
38 Supra note 18.
3 7Supra note 23.
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The original leading case in the area of whether profits are available for
the personal benefit of members is Moose Jaw Flying Club Limited v. M.N.R.38
In that case the corporation was incorporated as a non-profit organization for
the purpose of providing instruction in the art of flying. It had never paid any
dividends to its shareholders and in 1941 it amended its articles specifically to
prohibit the payment of dividends. The Appellant filed returns for 1940 and
1941 and was granted tax exemption. In 1942 the company went into voluntary
liquidation in the course of which its assets were distributed to its shareholders
to the extent of $51 for every $10.00 share. The Minister assessed the com-
pany for tax on its income in the years 1940 and 1941 on the basis that inasmuch
as the Company distributed money during the 1942 liquidation it must be
considered taxable in the years in which it was in operation. The Exchequer
Court (Angers, J.) decided the case basically on whether or not the income of
the company will enurq to the benefit of a stockholder or member. Although
the case was decided under s. 4(h) of the Income War Tax Act, 9 which section
had the words "enure to the benefit" of a member or shareholder rather than
the present wording of "payable to, or... otherwise available for the personal
benefit of" a member or shareholder, it has been held in other cases that there
is no significant difference between the two sections. 40 In the Moose Jaw Flying
Club case, it was held that as long as the capital and accumulated income of the
company will enure eventually to the benefit of the shareholders upon a wind-
ing up, then the Company cannot come within the provisions of the present
s. 62(1) (i). The judge found it to be an inescapable conclusion from the facts
of the case that upon the liquidation of the company the profits which were in
the form of surplus had to pass to the shareholders and members since they
could not go into any other hands by reason of the company's particular form
of corporate organization and the provisions of the Companies Act. It appeared
that if the company had so altered its corporate status that none of the accumu-
lated profits or capital could ever revert to any shareholder or member but had
to be consumed in the continued operation of a flying club or a similar venture,
it would have been very difficult for the Court to have upheld a tax assessment.
A similar situation arose in the Lakeview Golf Club case. 41 Recall that in
that case the company made a profit in each of the three years in question but
no dividends had ever been paid. However, By-law no. 35 provided that divi-
dends when earned and declared shall be paid to the shareholders. Cameron, J.
in the Exchequer Court considered the issue of whether or not undistributed
earnings are income which ensures to the benefit of the shareholders:
While that amount was not distributed to the shareholders, it was at all timespossible for the directors to declare dividends to the shareholders to such extent
as they had profit on hand. The value of the shares increased to the extent of suchincome was earned and, therefore, in my opinion such income enured to the benefit
of the shareholders or was available for the personal benefit of the shareholders
although not, in fact, paid to them.42
8849 D.T.C. 655, [1949] C.T.C. 279 (Exch.Ct.).
89lncome War Tax Act, R.S.C. 1927, c. 97.40See Cameron, J. in the Lakeview Golf Club case, supra note 23 at 1165, [1952]
C.T.C. at 279.
41Supra note 23.
421d. at 1166, E1952] C.T.C. at 282.
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Therefore, the effect of the undistributed earnings was twofold. First, the
surplus on hand increased the value of the shares held by the shareholders in
the golf club-that is, the earnings enured to their benefit. Secondly, the profits
were potentially available for the benefit of the shareholders. The directors
could have, at any time, declared dividends. The fact that dividends were not
declared is irrelevant. This second point is somewhat similar to our discussion
of the effect of the Letters Patent-if there is a possibility of distribution of
profit (or if there is no absolute restriction on the potential future distribution
of profit), then it cannot be said that no part of the income is payable to or
otherwise available for the personal benefit of a shareholder or member.
Of course, the St. Catherines Flying Training School case is of significant
importance since it was decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. Recall that
in that case the profits realized under the second agreement with the Crown
were held not taxable since the surplus resulting was held by the company upon
terms that were equivalent to saying that the company held the surplus in trust
for the Crown. The fact that all future avenues of distribution to the members
of the company were blocked by the Crown agreement was sufficient to state
that there was no possibility that the income of the club would be payable to or
otherwise available for the personal benefit of any of the members. However,
in the Exchequer Court decision of the St. Catherines Flying Training School
case, 48 the court dealt with the question of whether any part of the flying school's
income enures to the benefit of any shareholder or member. Thorson, P. indi-
cated the limits which are to be placed on the word "benefit":
That is not the kind of benefit contemplated by this section. Moreover, there
is no evidence that any of the six representatives or members would ever derive
any personal benefit even if the Appellant's surplus should be turned over to the
sponsoring club for the purpose of doing so would be to revive its activities. 44
Therefore, what he was saying, is that the benefit must be real and enure
directly to the person mentioned in the section of the taxing statute.
The Supreme Court of Canada held that the second agreement precluded
the possibility of any future distribution of profit. The fact that the company
could not distribute earnings during the period of its first contract with the
government did not effectively close out the possibility of future distributions:
the profits made were the property of the company and there was nothing in the
letters patent which prohibited it from retaining them and the prohibition against
declaring dividends or distributing profits was restricted to the period of the duration
of hostilities or the period during which the company was required to carry on
elementary training .... There was nothing which prohibited the declaration of
dividends or the distribution of profit after that time.45
Some resolution of this case with the previous ones should be attempted.
It can reasonably be stated that the Moose Jaw Flying Club case46 implied that
once a company has profit, one can never rule out the possibility that it will
eventually enure to the shareholders, by winding-up if necessary. Therefore,
if there is any possibility of future distribution on a winding-up to the
shareholders, then the organization will not achieve tax exempt status under
43Supra note 17.
441d. at 1237, [1952] C.T.C. at 371.
45Per Locke, J., supra note 20 at 1147, [1955] C.T.C. at 190.
46Supra note 38.
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s. 62(1) (i). However, on the facts of the Moose Jaw Flying Club case, a
liquidating dividend was actually paid to the shareholders and the operations
of the company were not so severely limited by the Letters Patent as to rule
out all possible profit purposes. The latter situation was the case in the second
contract in the St. Catherines Flying Training School case47 where it was impos-
sible to state either that the profits could possibly enure to the benefit of the
shareholders in the future or that the Letters Patent provided a possibility of
profit-making purposes. In the Moose Jaw Industrialization Fund Committee
case,48 the Chairman of the Income Tax Appeal Board distinguished the judg-
ment in the Moose Jaw Flying Club case and remarked that profits do not enure
to the benefit of shareholders merely by finding their way into the coffers of the
company. They must reach the shareholder, and one cannot assume that a
company will necessarily be wound up. This would seem to mean that so long
as the purposes of the company are such that all possible profit-making ventures
are impossible under the wording of the Letters Patent (as long as the company
does not fall within one of the four other enumerated possibilities), the fact that
profits may eventually be earned in the carrying out of the non-profit purposes
will not necessarily force the court to decide that on winding-up these profits
will be distributed to the members such that the organization cannot be granted
tax exemption.
Finally, one leading Supreme Court of Canada case in which all of these
issues were canvassed is Woodward's Pension Society v. M.N.R. 49 The pension
society was incorporated with stated objects "to assist in providing funds for
the payment of pensions" to employees of the Woodward Stores group of com-
panies. Over a series of years a substantial surplus was built up from the interest
differential between the interest it paid on its subscription for shares and the
interest it charged employees on their balances owing on share purchases. Also
dividends and capital gains on shares added to the surplus. In 1953 the company
commenced payments to the trustees of the Woodward Stores pension plan and
thereafter provided the trustees with all the funds necessary for the payment
of pensions. The bylaws gave the directors no power to apply the surplus other
than by paying it to the trustees and the by-laws also provided that upon dis-
solution all the assets of the company should be conveyed to the trustees. The
M.N.R. taxed the company on its income. The company claimed exemption
on the basis of s. 62(1) (i); alternately, the company claimed that it had no
income subject to tax since it could never appropriate its income for its own
purposes, but was required to pay its surplus, and upon dissolution all its assets,
to the trustees of the pension plan.
The Supreme Court of Canada first dealt with the issue of whether the
company was organized and operated exclusively for any other purpose except
profit. Judson, I. had little difficulty in deciding that the company failed to
show that it was organized and operated exclusively for non-profit purposes:
It is true that the appellant is not an ordinary commercial company but a society
incorporated under the Societies Act, R.S.B.C. 1936, c. 265, that no part of the
47Supra note 20.
48Supra note 18.
4062 D.T.C. 1002, [1962] C.T.C. 11 (S.C.C.), aff'g 59 D.T.C. 1253, [1959]
C.T.C. 399 (Exch.Ct.).
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appellant's property is payable to or otherwise available for the personal benefit
of any proprietor, member or shareholder, and that the appellant was organized for
the stated object and purpose of assisting in the provision of funds for pensions to
be paid to employees and ex-employees of the stores. Nevertheless, this last-named
purpose could not be achieved without the share plan which was designed to make
a profit to enable the payments to be made to the pension trustees.50
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the principle laid down
by the Exchequer Court5' that an exemption section is to be strictly construed
and that the taxpayer must bring himself squarely within it in order to qualify.
Therefore, both courts held that since the basic purpose of the company
was to raise money to establish funds for the pension plan, the fact that its
manner of raising funds was a non-commercial type of operation and that the
actual share transactions themselves produced no profit could not erase the fact
that the company was not organized exclusively for purposes other than profit.
The company also contended that it had no income subject to taxation
because the net interest received by the company was not income in its hands
because it was not received beneficially since it was impressed with an obliga-
tion that it be devoted to payment to the pension trust. In other words, the
company relied on the judgment in the St. Catherines Flying Training School
case where Locke, J. said:
Different considerations apply, in my opinion, to the profits realized from the
operations under the first contract and any surplus resulting from the operations
under the second contract. As to the latter, it appears to be undoubted that there
was no income liable to taxation since the surplus resulting was held by the respon-
dent upon terms that, unless the Minister should consent to its being paid over to a
flying club, it was to be paid to the Crown. The status of such monies does not,
therefore, differ from that which would have existed had the contracts simply
declared, without more, that the respondent would hold any surplus in trust for the
Crown. The respondent is, in my opinion, entitled to succeed upon this aspect of the
matter, not on the footing that the exempting provisions relied upon affect the
matter but on the ground that there was no income.52
However, the income received by the company in this case was its own
income and was not subject to the legal claim of any other person. The company
simply applied the money in accordance with its stated objects. The obligation
to pay the surplus to the trustees for the purposes of the pension plan cannot
be considered equivalent to saying that the company was a trustee of its surplus
funds in favour of the pension trust. In considering this argument, Judson, J.
strictly construed the effect of the incorporating instrument and by-laws:
One cannot construct such a trust of the surplus funds out of the instrument
incorporating the society and its by-laws. There was, in the first place, no trust of
the shares in which the appellant dealt by purchase and sale and by holding. If theincorporating instrument and the by-laws remain unchanged, the surplus funds are
to be paid over in a certain way from time to time and the assets on a dissolution
of the society are to be distributed in the same way. But this does not establish atrust. There is no obligation to make any payments which would enable the pension
trust to assert a claim that the appellant's income was the income ension
trust. The income might accumulate indefinitely. In fact, no payments were made
to the pension trust during the period 1945 to 1951 when the appellant was building
up a surplus. The society might never be dissolved, the objects might be changed,
and the by-laws changed.
My conclusion is that the incorporating instrument and by-laws do not con-
stitute a declaration of trust but are merely a statement of objects and purposes.
d at 1004, [1962] C.TC. at 14.
5159 D.T.C. 1253, 1259, [1959] C.T.C. 399, 411.52Supra note 20 at 1147, [1955] C.T.C. at 187.
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There was no income of a trust during the taxation year in question payable to a
beneficiary or other person beneficially entitled and the appeal fails on this ground
also.5 3
Therefore, it is again essential to consider the effect of the incorporating
instrument. The incorporating instrument will be strictly construed in order
to determine whether the purposes of the organization include profit-making
objects. However, in order for the court to hold that no income enures to the
members, there must be an absolute obligation to make all payments to a second
body such that the second body (here the pension trust) has a valid legal claim
that it is entitled to all monies held by the exempt taxpayer. Such a situation
allows the court to consider the exempt taxpayer a trustee for the second body.
A statement of objects in the incorporating instrument is insufficient to create
this situation because a statement is not an obligation as long as there is a possi-
bility that the by-laws and objects might be changed, then it cannot be success-
fully argued that no income is payable to or is available for the personal benefit
of any member or shareholder.
Conclusion
There are several inherent problems in the present method of taxing or
granting tax exemptions to clubs, societies, associations and non-profit organiza-
tions under s. 62 (1) (i).
As discussed, the organization must be organized and operated exclusively
for one of the enumerated purposes. However, the enumerated purposes which
are allowed do not seem to adequately cover the policy of this section. There
is no reason why organizations operated and organized exclusively for pleasure
or recreation should be allowed to earn profits and yet retain a tax exempt
status. Generally, in these types of organizations, the public is restricted and
membership is usually quite selective. Therefore, public policy would seem to
dictate that such organizations do not receive tax exempt status when similar
organizations which make a profit and distribute their profit do not get this
status.
With regard to those organizations which attempt to class themselves as
non-profit organizations, the Act is deficient in that there is no definition of
what is meant by such an organization. Therefore, resort must be made to the
common law and to the leading case of St. Catherines Flying School Limited.5 4
However, the meaning of non-profitable purposes which was discussed in that
case seems again to fly in the face of the purpose of the legislation. Recall that
Thorson, P. stated that profits could be made in the course of carrying out non-
profitable purposes.5 With this type of definition a good draftsman could draft
letters patent for an organization such that the purposes are exclusively non-
profit, but a necessary result could be that profit is made. In such a case,
the organization would still receive tax exempt status. According to the St.
Catherines case it is the motive or intention of the organization in not making
a profit that will allow it to become tax exempt. We would suggest that some-
where in the Act a definition of "any other purpose except profit" be formulated
53Supra note 49 at 1004-1005, [1962] C.T.C. at 15-16.
54Supra note 20.
4Supra note 22.
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or that an organization would be deemed not to be non-profit if it did in fact
make a profit. The distinction between purposes of the organization and the
results of carrying out those purposes seems to be a meaningless one.
Even if the present classification of non-profit organizations be retained,
it again seems meaningless that the court should pay so much attention to the
possible future distributions of profit. If the policy of the Act is to fairly readily
grant tax exempt status with a wide range of permissible purposes, then there
seems to be no reason why taxation couldn't be levied when profits are in fact
distributed or when assets are distributed on dissolution. The mere possibility
of future distribution of profit seems again to be a poor test.
The strictness with which the courts interpret the letters patent of an
organization in determining whether or not there is a future possible benefit
which will accrue to a member or shareholder would be a satisfactory test if
such a test were codified in the Act. It would not be difficult to present a sub-
section in- the Act to define what is meant by "payable to, or... otherwise
available for the personal benefit of, any proprietor, member or shareholder".
This is especially true since the words appear in virtually every subsection of
s. 62(1). A codification could be made in the following manner-the letters
patent or documents of formation must be such that there is no possible future
distribution of income to the members; that upon liquidation or dissolution
there is no possible manner in which the profits or assets could go to the
members or shareholders; that there is no way in which dividends can be
declared, etc.
The Woodwards Pension case 56 pointed out one deficiency of resorting
to the letters patent as a test of determining whether or not there is a possibility
of future distribution to the members. A statement of objects in the incorporated
instrument was considered insufficient to create an absolute obligation to make
all payments to a second body in the Woodwards case. The reason for this is
that the statement is not an obligation, it is simply a statement of intention.
However the courts never seem to have considered this paradoxical situation in
resorting to the close scrutiny of the letters patent. Such an inconsistency would
tend to support the view that the court should look much more closely at the
results of the organizations' operations rather than the stated objects.
THE TAXATION OF MISCELLANEOUS NON-PROFIT
OR CHARITABLE ORGANIZATIONS
Section 62 (1) (b) - Municipal Authorities, and
Section 62 (1) (c) - Municipal or Provincial Corporations
Section 62(1) (b) exempts certain municipal or public bodies from taxa-
tion. The exemption includes school district bodies, rural and unorganized
district bodies, and incorporated municipalities. All of these organizations are
creations of provincial governments. Note that the municipality must be in
Canada and that the function of government must be performed in Canada.
P6Supra note 49.
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Section 62(1) (c) exempts from tax the taxable income of any corpora-
tion, commission or association at least 90%o of the capital of which was owned
by the federal government, a provincial government or a Canadian municipality.
It also provides for the exemption from income tax of any corporation which
is the wholly owned subsidiary of such a corporation, commission or associa-
tion. The exemption does not apply for the 1969 and subsequent taxation
years where a person other than Her Majesty in right of Canada or a province
or a Canadian municipality had any right to acquire capital stock of the corpora-
tion, commission or association or the wholly owned subsidiary (or the parent of
the wholly owned subsidiary). Section 84(2), which is applicable to taxation
years commencing after 1951, provides that section 62(1) (c) does not apply to
any corporation which is specified in Schedule "D" to the Financial Administra-
tion Act. Such corporations are owned by the Federal Government and are
subject to income tax as provided by section 84. However, a wholly owned sub-
sidiary of such a corporation appears to be exempt under section 62(1) (c)
unless the subsidiary is also specified in Schedule "D" to the Financial Adminis-
tration Act.
Section 62(1)(d) - Agricultural Organizations,
Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce
In order for an organization to fall within this section it must fulfil two
conditions. The first is that it must be one of the enumerated types of organiza-
tions; the second is that no part of its income can be payable or available for
the benefit of members of shareholders.
The meaning of agricultural organizations has been considered in two
cases. Basically, they are organizations concerned with the advancement of
agriculture. This covers the practice or the science of cultivating the ground,
but is not confined to this and includes all activities coming within the ordinary
meaning of agriculture, such as the raising of livestock.ar
Section 62(1)(ga) - Low Cost Housing Corporations
This section provides for the exemption of a corporation constituted
exclusively to provide low cost housing accommodation for the aged. Again
it is essential that no part of the income be payable to or available for the benefit
of any member or shareholder.
Section 62(1)(gb) - Canadian Universities Foundation
This section exempts the Canadian Universities Foundation from paying
tax upon its taxable income. The Canadian Universities Foundation is a
corporation incorporated under federal jurisdiction and is the successor to the
National Conference of Canadian Universities.
57See Rex v. Davenport, [1928] 2 D.L.R. 852 and Brooks v. Moore (1907), 13
B.C.R. 91.
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Section 62(1)(gc) - Non-profit Corporations for Scientific Research
This section exempts from tax certain corporations which comply with
the following conditions:
(1) The corporation must be constituted exclusively for carrying on or
promoting scientific research. Although scientific research is not
defined, it will presumably have the meaning given to the expression
by section 72(4) (b) and the Income Tax Regulations, Part XXIX.
(2) No part of the Corporation's income may be payable or available for
the benefit of any proprietor, member or shareholder.
(3) The corporation may not have acquired control of any other corpora-
tion. Control is defined in section 62(3a) if more than 50% of its
issued share capital belongs to the other corporation or to the other
corporation or persons with whom the other corporation does not
deal at arm's length.
(4) The corporation may not carry on any business.
(5) The corporation must have expended in Canada amounts which are
either expenditures on scientific research directly undertaken by it
or payments to an association, university, college or research institu-
tion to be used for scientific research. Approved institutions are
described in section 72(1) (a) (ii) or (iii) or section 72(4) (a). The
aggregate of the amounts expended on scientific research must not
be less than 90% of the corporation's income for the taxation period.
However, the effects of section 62(4) and section 62(5) is that the
corporation is permitted to accumulate and keep on hand as a reserve
an amount equal to its income for the preceding year. The effect of
section 62(3)(9) (b) is that the value of any gifts or contributions
made to the corporation must be taken into account in determining
the amount which the corporation must distribute during the period
in order to qualify for exemption under section 62(1) (gc). In other
words, these gifts and contributions must be included in computing
the corporation's income.
Section 62(1)(h) - Labour Organizations
This section provides for the exemption of labour unions, lodges, fraternal
organizations, benevolent orders or societies. This section is a conceivable "tax
loophole" since the only condition to be fulfilled for exemption under this
section is that the organization fall within one of the enumerated types. There
is no restriction which prevents the organizations in this section from carrying
on business or from making profits; furthermore, there is no provision as in most
of the other subsections of section 62(1) that the income of the organization
not be payable to, or otherwise available for, the personal benefit of any pro-
prietor, member or shareholder. Therefore, it would seem that as long as an
organization can be classed as one of the types mentioned in this section, that
the organization is free to carry on business, make any amount of profit, dis-
tribute this profit to its members or shareholders, and still not be taxed on this
income.
1971"I
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Section 62(la) and section 62(lb) have been enacted to ensure that
benevolent or fraternal organizations do not get exemption in respect of taxable
income derived from carrying on a life insurance business.
Section 62(1)(j) - Mutual Insurance Corporations
The taxable income of a mutual insurance corporation will be exempt
from income tax for any period in which it receives its premium wholly from
the insurance of churches, schools or other charitable organizations.
Section 62(1)(k) - Credit Unions and Co-operative Credit Societies
This section provides for the exemption of certain corporations or associa-
tions which have been incorporated or organized as credit unions or co-operative
credit societies. The terms "credit union" and "co-operative credit society"
are not defined in the Act and will be interpreted according to their common
law meanings.
These organizations will qualify for exemption if they are restricted
to carrying on the business in one Province and if they derive their income
primarily from one or more of the sources listed in subparagraph (i). The
essential thing to note is that the exemption will not be denied if a small part
of the income is derived from other sources (i.e. profit-making sources). It is
a question of fact whether the revenues are derived "primarily" from the sources
listed in this section. One important issue under this section is the effect of an
organization which carries on its business in more than one province but by its
incorporating instrument is restricted to carrying on business in only one
province.
If the credit union or co-operative credit society does not qualify for
exemption under subparagraph (i), it may qualify under subparagraph (ii).
It will qualify under this subparagraph only if all its members are corporations
or associations which are listed in (A), (B), or (C) or are corporations or
associations no part of whose income is payable to or otherwise personally
benefits any shareholder or member. With respect to the question whether a
member was incorporated for charitable purposes within the meaning of (C)
in subparagraph (ii), the issue is one of the common law meaning of "charitable
purposes".
Section 62(1)(I) - Housing Corporations
The exemption provided by this section is designed to cover the limited
dividend housing corporations as set out in the National Housing Act, R.S.C.
1952, c. 188.
Section 62(1)(p) - Co-Operative Corporations
A co-operative corporation which is exempt from taxation by virtue of
section 73 does not have to pay tax on its taxable income for the period in which
it had such exemption.
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Sections 62(1)(q), (r), (ra), (rb), (rc) - Trusts Established for the
Administration of Pensions, Profit-sharing Plans, Supplementary
Unemployment Benefit Plans, Registered Retirement Savings Plans,
Deferred Profit Sharing Plans
These trusts are exempt from taxation on their taxable income for the
period in which they were organized for the types of trusts as mentioned.
SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM OF TAXATION
OF NON-PROFIT ENTITIES
Introduction
The present exemption from taxation of charities and other non-profit
organizations is difficult to justify. The significant provisions of section 62 of
the present Income Tax Act are effectively identical with those of section 57
of the 1948 Income Tax Act"8 and analogous to section 4 of the Income War
Tax Act59 Thus the taxation of these entities has remained unchanged since
income tax was first imposed on this country. At that time, the economic signifi-
cance of income taxation was not as great as what it is to-day. To-day, income
tax is the federal government's greatest source of revenue, and the exemptions
allowed in section 62 are concerned with vast quantities of income. Therefore,
non-profit exemptions ought not to be continued to-day without proper justifica-
tion.
The Carter Commission0 recognized this problem: "In fact, organizations
have been extended exempt status over the years without the establishment
of any clear principles as to why such exemption should be granted and who
should receive it. ' ' 61 The Commission then went on to discuss the problem and
make recommendations to which we will refer later. Unfortunately, however,
the White Paper proposed only to subject the investment income of some of
the organizations described in section 62(1) (i) to corporation tax.6 2 This
proposal is now being put into force by section 149 (5) of the Bill. 6 3
Thus we can see that the situation at the present time is far from clear and
there is a need to re-examine the rationale behind the exemption of non-profit
entities. Since these exemptions have been in force for many years already, we
would like to conduct such examination in the light of the consequences of our
present day exemptions, and whether these consequences are justified.
In our opinion there are two important consequences of tax exemption.
The first is the fact that tax exempt entities are in fact publicly subsidized, and
the second is the creation of unfair competition.
58S.C. 1948, c. 52.
59s.C. 1917, c. 28.
6 OReport of the Royal Commission on Taxation, hereinafter referred to as The
Carter Commission.
611d. V. 4, 128-9.
62EJ. Benson, Minister of Finance, Proposals for Tax Reform, 1969, at 69.
63Note that section 149(5) of the Bill applies only to clubs, societies or associations
whose main purpose is to "provide dining, recreational or sporting facilities for its
members".
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Public Subsidy
The simple fact that most entities pay a tax on their income means that
those entities that are exempt from tax are in a sense subsidized by the tax-
paying entity. Income tax to most organizations is an inherent operating
expense just like rent. Therefore, a tax exempt organization is subsidized in
two ways. First, it is freed of the inherent expense of tax, and secondly, all other
taxpayers must pay just a little bit more to make up for the taxes not paid by
exempt entities, or, perhaps a better way to look at it is, assuming that the
government's revenue needs remain the same, if tax exempt organizations were
to lose that status and be required to pay income tax, all other taxpayers' taxes
would be correspondingly lower.
Therefore, in our opinion, if an entity is to receive a public subsidy in the
form of tax exemption, there must be some justification. This justification may
be in either of two ways. There should be either a compensating economic
benefit to the public or, at the very least, an aesthetic benefit to the public. In
most cases, these two justifications will go hand in hand. For example, an
entity organized for the purposes of educating the mentally retarded serves the
public in both a moral sense and in an economical sense, since mentally retarded
people, if not educated, would constitute an expense requiring public funds.
On the other hand, there may be public moral justifications in sending Christian
missionaries to Africa, but no economic public benefit. In either case, however,
there is some sort of a public benefit served by the organization. For this reason,
it justifiably receives a public subsidy in the form of tax exemption.
It could be argued that the taxation system should not be used for the
purpose of providing public subsidies. In our opinion, however, such an argu-
ment is not realistic. Perhaps in theory the aim of taxation is merely to provide
public revenue on an equitable basis, and problems of public incentive and
subsidy ought to be irrelevant. But, in fact, these problems have always been
considered in a basis for taxation and we believe that in the interest of efficiency
they ought to remain so. After all, it is far more efficient to simply not tax the
appropriate entities, than to tax them with the one hand and reimburse them
with the other.
What must be found, however, is a fair basis for providing public subsidies
in the form of tax exemption. In our opinion, the present exemption sections
do not do so. The fact that an entity is precluded from distributing its profits
to its members is not sufficient justification. Certainly, if the members receive
no profits then they should not be taxed on them, but this isn't a justification
for exempting the organization itself. As we have already stated, the only justi-
fication for the latter should be some sort of public benefit.
In our opinion, a fair basis for exemption ought to be premised on a proper
definition of "charity" and "for charitable purposes". If we can define that
word to mean effectively "an activity worthy of public subsidy" then the problem
is solved. With such a definition, an exemption would be granted to any
organization actually operating a "charity" or organized "for charitable pur-
poses". By definition, these organizations would be providing a public benefit
and thus entitled to public subsidy. All other organizations would not be
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exempt (or at least their exemption could not be justified by a public subsidy
argument).
At this point we are not prepared to draft a conclusive definition of charity.
Suffice it to say that the definition in Pemsel's case is not appropriate, as the
Carter Commission recognized,6 nor would its slight modification 5 do the job.
What would be required would be a comprehensive definition including all
activities worthy of public subsidy and excluding all those not so worthy. The
definition in Pemsel's case does not accomplish this.
The end result would be that only organizations which were charitable
under the new definition would receive exemption. This is as it should be, we
believe. There is no reason why a public benefit social club organized for the
recreation of its members should receive a public subsidy in the form of tax
exemption. The same can be said of labour unions, and credit unions, organized
solely to benefit its members. Of course, entities organized for social welfare,
civic improvement, to provide low cost housing accommodation for the aged,
to carry on or promote scientific research, or for some other similar purpose,
ought still to receive an exemption, but such organizations would be included
in our new definition of "charity".
These new proposals would greatly simplify the tax laws in our opinion.
There would be a codified definition of "charity" and "for charitable purposes"
and the restriction that no benefit could enure to a member. Of course there
would be problems in interpretation of our new definitions, but we doubt that
this will prove to be any more difficult than the interpretation of the common
law definitions. Thus, our scheme would simply exempt charitable organiza-
tions and tax all others.
Unfair Competition
But this conclusion does not mean that charitable organizations should be
exempt on all their income, for this too would be inequitable. There can be no
doubt that unfair competition results when exempt entities compete with tax-
paying entities in the same business. Also, there can be no argument with the
Carter Commission's premise that "there should not be any tax concessions that
give one business a competitive advantage over another, and the present exemp-
tion of business income earned by charities could well be regarded as such an
advantage." 66 The Commission's conclusion is unavoidable: "No business
activity of a charitable organization should be given a competitive advantage. '8 7
However, having thus concluded, the Carter Commission's recommenda-
tions would fail to put into practice what it had preached. Instead, its system
of taxing charities is based on a moral judgment of what it believes to be proper
and reasonable activities of such an organization. To illustrate this bias, we
point out the following: "The primary purpose of a charity is to collect dona-
tions and then to apply these funds in a manner prescribed by the organization;
64The Carter Commission, V.4, 132.
65d.
661d. V.4,.13 1.
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it is not a basic function of a charity to be in business in competition with other
business operations.... It is not uncommon for a charitable organization to
have funds available in excess of its current requirements, and the investment
of these funds to earn income is a reasonable function of the organization." 68
In other words, the Carter Commission says that the receipt of donations
and investments of temporarily idle funds are reasonable and proper activities
for a charity, but the operation of or substantial involvement in a business are
in some way not proper activities. Interestingly when it comes down to its actual
recommendations, the Carter Commission proposes continuing tax exemptions
for donation and investment receipts, but taxing all business income.69 Note
also that the Carter Commission claims that the justification for these proposals
is to prevent unfair competition, since it states: "A conclusion on the tax treat-
ment of competing businesses is required, and we recommend that the tax
exemption should not be extended to business income."70
We have already pointed out that the Carter Commission believed that
there was something inherently improper in a charity's involvement in business,
and it is our contention that its proposals were based on this moralistic bias
rather than on the pure logic of the prevention of unfair competition.
As some of the critics of the Carter Commission have pointed out71, to
leave investment income untaxed is to perpetuate unfair competition. A taxable
investor is looking at his after tax return when he considers making any invest-
ment whereas a charitable organization can make the investment at a consider-
ably reduced interest rate and still get a better return than the taxable investor.
Obviously, the borrower is in a better position when dealing with a charitable
investor than with a taxable one. The result is unfair competition. Taxable
investors may be forced to accept a lower rate of return than would otherwise
be available because charitable investors provide an unfair alternative to the
borrower.
The solution of course is simple. If the Carter Commission were really
attempting to eliminate unfair competition, it would have proposed taxing
charities on their investment income as well. Since it did not, we can only
assume that its proposals were motivated by other factors, in this case, a moral
judgment.
This is not to say that moral and public benefit have nothing to do with
taxation. In fact, as we have already discussed, these are often the very reasons
for exempting charitable organizations. But in the case of investment income,
its exemption cannot be justified by an unfair competition argument as the
Carter Commission has attempted to do. Instead, the exemption of investment
income should be justified by a public benefit argument. Complex rules defining
what sorts of investments produce sufficient public benefit are required. For
example, investments in common shares of private companies which produce
little or no income should be discouraged as should holdings of real estate that
08d. V.4, 133.
69For their definition of "business income", see V.4 134.
701d.V.4, 134.
71E.g., Asper, The Carter Commission Report on Taxation-An Objective View,
No. 5 at 11.
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are not used to substantially further charitable purposes. On the other hand,
exemptions should be allowed to charitable organizations on income-producing
lands or real estate used to further its charitable purposes. The end result of
these rules must be to grant exemption on the investment income of charitable
organizations only when those investments are appropriate to the operation of
such organizations in the sense that the public is being adequately benefitted.
But in other cases, inappropriate investments should be discouraged by tax
penalties.
It is interesting that in the case of private clubs and similar organizations
now exempt under section 62(1) (i) of the Act, the Carter Commission recog-
nized that "there is no reason to permit portfolio [i.e. investment) income to
be received as part of this tax exempt activity." 72 Thus, it did propose the taxa-
tion of investment income, as well as business income, in the case of these
organizations. We wholeheartedly agree with this proposal.
However, the Carter Commission would still grant this type of organization
exemption on its income derived from primary purpose activities. Thus,
"membership fees and the revenue and bar facilities attributable to their use by
members and a limited number of guests are part of the exempt activity."78
But income derived from investments or activities with outsiders would be
taxed. The Carter Commission again justifies its proposals on an unfair compe-
tition theory thusly: "We do not feel that this procedure would produce inequi-
ties between private clubs and competing organizations." 74
We cannot agree with this statement. For example, the green fees at a
profit-making golf course must reflect the fact that the golf course is taxable
as opposed to the membership dues at a non-profit course, no part of which
would go for income tax. Thus, a potential golfer will get more value for his
money by becoming a member of a non-profit club. This situation is further
aggravated by the fact that any expansion of recreational facilities at the club
would be paid for with tax exempt dollars, whereas if the member were to go
out and purchase those additional benefits, he could only do so with tax paid
dollars. In other words, although he is precluded from receiving pecuniary
benefits, he does receive other benefits which are worth much more than they
normally would be since no tax is paid on them, either by the club or himself.
The Carter Commission recognized this problem75 and also its ideal solu-
tion: "In principle, income should be imputed to those individuals who merge
these income earnings and personal benefit activities; there is no difference in
the taxable capacity of those who merge the activities and those who do not."76
But it concluded, and we cannot argue with it, that this solution was impractical.
There is no doubt that the Commission's proposals would lessen the problem,
since at least the members' benefits could not then come directly from tax
exempt outside business, but it did not go far enough, in our opinion.
72The Carter Commission, V.4, 138.
731d.
741d. V.4, 139.
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Granted that it would not be practical to tax members on non-pecuniary
benefits, often intangible, received from private clubs, but is this any reason for
exempting the club itself from corporation tax? In our opinion, the taxation
of such a club on all its income would at least eliminate the competitive edge
it had over profit-making competitors to the extent that .a part of the members'
dues would go for the club taxes, just as a part of a golfer's green fees at a profit-
making course does.
Our proposal to tax these organizations on all their income (i.e. to elimi-
nate the exemption entirely) would also remove a potential problem in the
Carter Commission's proposals, namely, the definition of what constitutes busi-
ness income. For example, would "the lunchroom activity of a golf course
located 13 miles from the nearest restaurant be considered a service or a business
activity?" 77
From the point of view of unfair competition, there is not much more that
we can say that we have not already said about the Carter Commission's pro-
posal to tax those entities like labour unions, professional organizations, boards
of trade, and agricultural organizations. It proposed to tax them like charities,
that is to tax their business income but exempt their investment income. The
only difference would be that "contributions and donations to these organiza-
tions.., would not be deductible as charitable contributions, but would usually
qualify as ordinary business or employment expenses. 78
We would also treat them as we would charities, if they come within our
definition, and tax them on both inappropriate investment and business income
for reasons of unfair competition.
In short, in order to prevent unfair competition, and provide a more
equitable taxation system, we would propose the reducing of existing tax
exemption for charitable and non-profit organizations in all cases except where
there is a sufficient benefit to the public to justify such an exemption.
77Asper, supra note 71 at 12.
78The Carter Commission, V.4, 140.
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